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Introduction
Most deﬁnitions of real property market value include a qualifying assumption that the
buyer and seller are typically motivated (e.g., Boyce and Kinnard, 1984). If an
institutional seller of a foreclosed property is subjected to typical motivations, all else
being equal, the sale price an institutional seller is able to negotiate for a given property
in a given market should not be systematically different from a price that would be
negotiated by a typically motivated seller.
Institutional sellers marketing properties obtained through foreclosure may not be
typically motivated. There are forces affecting owners of foreclosed properties that could
cause them to be receptive to accepting below-market prices in exchange for a reduction
in time on market (Downs, 1992; Cory and Zinn, 1992). Regulatory capital requirements
provide an incentive to reduce the size of a ﬁrm’s nonperforming asset balance sheet
category. Also, disposition of real estate owned through the sale of foreclosed properties
may have a beneﬁcial effect on a company’s stock price and credit rating (Palmer, 1991;
Downs, 1992).
Because institutional owners of foreclosed properties appear to be subject to atypical
motivations that cause them to value some degree of reduction in time on market, and
marketing time can be compressed by acceptance of a below-market price (Moore, 1987),
it is reasonable to expect market prices for foreclosed properties to be systematically less
than market prices for non-foreclosed properties. Therefore, if a signiﬁcant price
differential exists, foreclosed property sales cannot be relied upon as indicators of
expected market value unless they are adjusted for the foreclosure-sale price effect.
A small amount of empirical evidence exists showing a systematic price reduction for
foreclosed property sales. However, the studies are limited to residential properties
THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 1
101
William G. Hardin, III*
Marvin L. Wolverton** The Relationship between
Foreclosure Status and
Apartment Price
*Department of Economics and Business Administration, Morehouse College, 830 Westview Drive, Atlanta,
Georgia 30314.
**Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington
99164-4746.
Date Revised—July 1995; Accepted—October 1995.
Abstract. Empirical studies disclose that foreclosed residential properties sell at a discount
from the expected market price for non-foreclosed residences. This investigation shows that
prior ﬁndings on residential properties can be extended to include income-producing
properties. In addition, it employs market rent to control for variation in property quality.
An analysis of apartment sales in Phoenix, Arizona, demonstrates that foreclosure-status
apartments sell at a 22% discount when compared to non-foreclosure apartment sales. The
rationale for accepting discounted prices may be atypical seller motivations such as a need
to satisfy regulatory capital requirements, to mitigate negative stock price effects, or to
protect credit ratings.intended for owner occupancy, are unable to fully control for possible differences in
quality between foreclosed and non-foreclosed properties, and are conﬁned to two
locations—Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans, 1990), and
Arlington, Texas (Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk, 1994). This study controls for
potential quality differences by utilizing market rent as an independent variable.
Additionally, it widens the scope of investigation by looking into the foreclosure-sale
price effect on one type of income-producing property and by geographically extending
earlier ﬁndings.
Literature Review
A lack of adequate data makes it difﬁcult to empirically test for atypical foreclosed
property seller motivation. However, a body of literature exists that uncovers a corporate-
level rationale for seller motivation that is atypical to that found in the real estate market
in general. In addition, recent studies have demonstrated signiﬁcantly lower market
prices for foreclosed residential properties consistent with expected motivation. The
literature review begins with a portrayal of an institutional seller not affected by atypical
motives.
Kane’s (1990) ‘‘efﬁcient salvor’’ can be used to deﬁne the ideal role played by an
institution’s foreclosed property disposition department. In a study of the efﬁciency of
the Resolution Trust Corporation in salvaging savings and loan industry assets, Kane
employed the idea of an efﬁcient salvor in order to identify the four functions of a
salvor—rescue, appraisal, property management, and sale. He deﬁned an efﬁcient salvor
as one who preserves asset values and expands markets by locating, informing and
servicing parties that would not otherwise consider purchasing the asset. In this rather
unconstrained environment the seller’s goal is simply to maximize the present value of the
asset. However, institutional sellers of foreclosed real estate do not operate in the efﬁcient
salvor’s ideal, constraint-free world.
According to Cory and Zinn (1992) the ‘‘traditional orderly-reduction-in-assets’’
(efﬁcient salvor) approach to removal of real estate exposure was not the most effective
method for accelerating asset disposition. Banks were found to have relied on more
aggressive strategies in order to facilitate faster liquidation of real estate assets. Downs
(1992) identiﬁed constraints that hinder an institutional seller’s ability to function as an
efﬁcient salvor and outlined several incentives for aggressive liquidation strategies. In
addition to bank regulation and the resulting need to meet more stringent equity capital
requirements, he noted that the stock market devaluated banks that had high proportions
of their assets in real estate. Furthermore, bank credit ratings tended to decline in
response to increasing exposure to real estate risk. Downs found that bank management
dealt with excessive exposure to real estate by not making real estate loans and by
attempting to accelerate disposition of foreclosed real estate.
In an empirical study of data from 1988 for real estate owned by institutions under
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) receivership; Curry, Blalock
and Cole (1991) investigated the relative efﬁciency of public-sector (FSLIC receivership
staff), quasi-public-sector (Federal Asset Disposition Association), and private-sector
(private contractors) management of the disposition of distressed real estate properties.
They computed a recovery rate as a means of measuring relative efﬁciency. Recovery rate
was deﬁned as the present value of income recovered through management and
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the original book value of the loan less principal paid off during the loan term and less
writedowns taken prior to takeover of the asset by FSLIC. The study’s ﬁnding of a 64%
recovery rate could indicate the presence of a systematic price reduction. No analysis was
made, however, of the relationship of disposition price to expected market price at the
time of disposition. In addition, differences in mean recovery rate by sector were
confounded by between-group variation in local market vitality, asset management
difﬁculty, and adequacy of the writedown prior to FSLIC receivership.
Two studies have been undertaken to investigate the extent to which foreclosed
residential property disposition prices were reﬂective of expected market prices at the
time of sale. Shilling et al. (1990) conducted a study of sixty-two residential condominium
sales from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, occurring during 1985. They found that foreclosure
sales by a local ﬁnancial institution were, on average, 24% lower in price than non-
foreclosure sales. Forgey et al. (1994) provided an extension of the Shilling et al. ﬁndings
by examining a dataset consisting of 2,482 single-family residential property sales
obtained from the Arlington, Texas, multiple listing service sold ﬁles over the period of
July 1991 through January 1993. Foreclosure sales constituted 11.28% of the sample.
They employed a log-linear regression model, similar to Shilling et al., and found a 23%
reduction in price for foreclosed property sales.
The preceding empirical results appear to be contrary to the efﬁcient salvor’s goal of
maximizing the present value of asset income and asset sale price. Although these results
seem to reveal suboptimal behavior, Downs (1990) identiﬁed rational motives for
disposition strategies that substitute liquidation speed for maximized liquidation price. If
mitigation of stock market devaluations of bank securities, preservation of credit ratings,
and regulatory capital requirement concerns are beneﬁts that exceed costs associated with
price discounts required to reduce time on market, then a motivation effect should be
generalizable across property type, location and foreclosed-property owner. With this in
mind, this study extends the Shilling et al. (1990) and Forgey et al. (1994) investigations.
Statistical Hypothesis and Model
The following statistical hypothesis is similar to Forgey et al. (1994), and was tested by
use of an analysis of covariance regression model (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1990):
Ho: Foreclosure-status apartments do not sell at a discount when compared
to non-foreclosure apartment sales.
HA: Foreclosure-status apartments do sell at a discount when compared to
non-foreclosure apartment sales.
Ideally, an income property valuation model would be based on capitalization of net
operating income. However, due to an inability to access operating expense data for each
sale, the model for the apartment price function is based on capitalization of potential
gross income controlling for covariates that affect gross income multipliers. Covariates
fall into two categories—variables that affect net income via vacancy and the expense
ratio, and variables that affect the capitalization rate applicable to net income. The
valuation model employed was:
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where
OREO 5 1 if the property was a foreclosure, otherwise 0;
PGR 5 potential gross rent (market rent per unit at the time of sale times
number of units); and
Yi 5 a vector of covariates that impact the potential gross rent multiplier by
either affecting net income per dollar of gross rent or the capitalization
rate applicable to net income.
Rent (PGR) is appropriate for inclusion as a single, observable independent variable
due to the study’s interest in price-related market segmentation rather than an
investigation of the structure of market rent. The PGR variable captures the hedonic
price (market rent) of property attributes, thereby controlling for differences in property
quality. Guntermann and Norrbin (1987) conﬁrmed this relationship for the Phoenix,
Arizona, apartment market. Covarying, concomitant variables (Yi) were included to
reduce error variability by extraction of extraneous variation from the model.
Appropriate covariates are vacancy of the property as of the sale date (VAC), property
age on the sale date (AGE), a dummy variable signifying presence of a master electrical
meter (M_METER), parking ratio (PK_RATIO), date of sale (DATE), and location
within the Phoenix market.
Vacancy, age, master metering, and parking ratio can affect potential gross rent
multiples by causing variation in the net income ratio (NET INCOME4PGR). Vacancy
affects the net income ratio by reducing the amount of property revenue available to
cover operating expenses. With regard to the age effect, older properties are expected to
exhibit higher maintenance costs, hence lower net income ratios. (Also, terminal
capitalization rate expectations are generally higher for older properties.) At master-
metered buildings property owners pay apartment utility costs, therefore operating
expenses can be greater when utility costs are not fully passed through to tenants.
Inadequate on-site parking is included also as a covariate because it may have an impact
on a property’s sustainable occupancy rate.
Date of sale and location affect potential gross rent multipliers through their effect on
capitalization rates. Capitalization rates can vary by sale date as a result of varying
investor perceptions and changing interest rates. Partitioning the data into submarkets
accounts for geographic variation in investors’ future income growth expectations, which
are reﬂected by differing capitalization rates. For example, median household income and
income growth for the Phoenix market is highest in the Scottsdale area and lowest in the
south-Phoenix submarket. Market segments included in the model were central- and
north-Phoenix, City of Mesa, City of Tempe, City of Scottsdale, northwest cities
(Glendale and Peoria), south-Phoenix, and a variable denoting outlying property
locations. Recognition of submarket segmentation in order to obtain a better measure of
marginal price effects is consistent with Smith and Kroll (1989) and Palmquist (1984).
A log-linear regression model was estimated to guard against violation of the
assumption of normality of unexplained dependent variable error. Another beneﬁt of this
estimation model form is the ability to easily interpret the indicated percentage difference
in price for foreclosed properties (Shilling et al., 1990; Forgey et al., 1994).
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Sample data was taken from apartment sales to non-institutional buyers in Phoenix,
Arizona, that closed between January 1993 and November 1994. Data was obtained from
Comps, Inc. of San Diego, California, a primary provider of veriﬁed market data to
appraisal practitioners in the Phoenix market.
Although the dataset is relatively small compared to the 2,482-observation residential
dataset examined by Forgey et al. (1994), the dataset size difference is representative of
the overall scale disparity between single-family and multifamily residential markets. The
dataset is, however, similar in size to the sixty-two-observation residential condominium
dataset examined by Shilling et al. (1990). Of the ninety sample sales, 10% were
foreclosure sales. As shown in Exhibit 1, the average property age on the sale date was
18.1 years, and ranged from 6 to 39 years. Unit count ranged from 25 to 132, with an
average of just under 53. Vacancy averaged 12.4%, and it ranged from no vacancy to
100% vacancy. Potential gross rent ranged from $93,360 to $673,200. Four complexes
were master-metered, indicating that the owner paid most, if not all, of the utility expense
at these four observations. Average sale price was $1,029,415.
The foreclosure and non-foreclosure groups appear to be reasonably similar, based on
a comparison of metric variables (see Exhibit 2). On average, the non-foreclosure group
sales are slightly more recent, smaller in size and unit count, older, and exhibit marginally
higher vacancy rates. Average potential gross rent for the non-foreclosure group is 13%
less than average potential gross rent for the foreclosure group, however average price for
the non-foreclosure group is only slightly lower (.4%).
Using only the descriptive data, an observed difference in potential gross rent multiple
(PGRM) provides a preliminary indication of below-market price performance for the
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Exhibit 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum
PRICE 1,029,415 605,797 225,000 3,400,000
DATE 9.7333 6.1823 0 22
OREO .10 .3017 0 1
PHX .60 .4926 0 1
MESA .1778 .3845 0 1
TEMPE .10 .3017 0 1
S_DALE .0444 .2072 0 1
NW_CITY .0444 .2072 0 1
S_PHX .0111 .1054 0 1
OTHER .0222 .1482 0 1
SIZE 40,444 19,876 14,500 117,480
PGR 242,119 117,146 93,360 673,200
VAC 12.4444 15.0670 0 100
UNITS 52.9889 21.9798 25 132
AGE 18.1111 9.6168 6 39
PK _RATIO 1.4009 .3945 .40 2.51
M_METER .0444 .2072 0 1
N590
Source: derived by authors from sample dataforeclosure group. The mean potential gross rent multiplier (PRICE4PGR) was 4.24 for
the non-foreclosure group versus 3.68 for the foreclosure group. However, variables other
than foreclosure status (i.e., covariates) may be accounting for this observed difference.
The following section investigates whether or not the difference in price is statistically
signiﬁcant and due to foreclosure status by controlling for subgroup variation in the
covariates.
Empirical Results
An analysis of covariance, log-linear, OLS regression model was employed to investigate
the relationship between foreclosure status and sale price. The following regression
equation was used, with a central- or north-Phoenix location serving as the base case:
LOGPRICE5f(OREO, PGR; MESA, TEMPE, S_DALE, NW_CITY, S_PHX,
OTHER, DATE, VAC, AGE, PK_RATIO, M_METER) , (2)
where
LOGPRICE 5 natural logarithm of the sale price;
OREO 5 1, if a foreclosure sale, 0 otherwise;
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Exhibit 2
Comparison of Group Means
Non-Foreclosure Foreclosure





















Source: derived by authors from sample dataPGR 5 potential gross rent at date of sale;
MESA 5 1, if in the City of Mesa, 0 otherwise;
TEMPE 5 1, if in the City of Tempe, 0 otherwise;
S_DALE 5 1, if in the City of Scottsdale, 0 otherwise;
NW_CITY 5 1, if in Cities of Glendale or Peoria, 0 otherwise;
S_PHX 5 1, if in south Phoenix, 0 otherwise;
OTHER 5 1, if in an outlying suburb, 0 otherwise;
DATE 5 closing date, in months prior to November 1994;
VAC 5 vacancy rate at the property at date of sale;
AGE 5 age of the property in years as of the sale date;
PK_RATIO 5 on-site parking spaces divided by number of units;
M_METER 5 1, if master-metered, 0 otherwise.
Exhibit 3 shows the OLS regression result. The model accounts for approximately 88%
of the sample’s variation in apartment project price. Variables OREO and PGR and
covariates S_DALE, OTHER, VAC, AGE, and M_METER are signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. Signs on the variables and signiﬁcant covariates are as expected. The positive sign
on PGR indicates an increase in value as rent increases. The Scottsdale location sign
reveals the submarket’s expected positive inﬂuence on the capitalized value of rent.
Vacancy, age and master metering all show negative signs, indicating lower values for
more vacant, older and master-metered properties. There is no a priori expectation,
however, regarding the sign of the OTHER coefﬁcient.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORECLOSURE STATUS, APARTMENT PRICE 107
Exhibit 3
Regression Results
Variable Coefﬁcient t-Statistic p-Value VIF
Intercept 12.809754 91.176 .0001 .000
OREO 2.251231 22.999 .0037 1.265
PGR .000004 20.518 .0001 1.130
MESA .078846 1.179 .2422 1.318
TEMPE .103692 1.216 .2278 1.311
S_DALE .268576 2.372 .0202 1.090
NW_CITY 2.006578 2.058 .9542 1.110
S_PHX 2.333308 21.533 .1294 1.040
OTHER .382965 2.236 .0175 1.081
DATE 2.005100 21.305 .1958 1.156
VAC 2.003015 21.934 .0568 1.090
AGE 2.009430 23.384 .0011 1.423
PK_RATIO .082509 1.169 .2462 1.537







Source: derived by authors from sample dataThe signiﬁcant p-value of .0037 and negative coefﬁcient for OREO indicates that the
null hypothesis of no discount in price for foreclosure apartments is rejected, and it
supports a conclusion that foreclosure apartments do sell for less than non-foreclosure
apartments. Also, as indicated by the variance inﬂation factors (VIF) shown in Exhibit 3
(Neter et al., 1990), the model is not excessively multicollinear. In addition, the model
does not appear to be heteroskedastic based on White’s (1980) test (p-value5.7218).
The coefﬁcient on OREO can be transformed into an indication of the percentage of
price reduction for foreclosed properties by using the relationship PERCENT
DISCOUNT5100 [e 225123121] or 222.2% (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).1 The
indicated price discount of 22.2% is compatible with the Forgey et al. (1994) ﬁnding of a
20.4% discount for single-family residences in Arlington, Texas, and the 21.3% residential
condominium discount found by Shilling et al. (1990) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.2
Conclusion
This effort was undertaken to integrate prior ﬁndings of systematically discounted
foreclosure property sale prices by Forgey et al. (1994) and Shilling et al. (1990) with
explanations that rationalize this behavior. Rationalizations found in the literature are
that foreclosed property owners appear to be motivated by satisfaction of regulatory
capital requirements, control over negative stock price effects, and protection of credit
ratings. As a consequence, this class of property sellers does not ﬁt the market value
deﬁnition of a typically motivated seller, and they have a rationale for accepting reduced
market prices in exchange for a quick sale. Additionally, the study broadens the empirical
ﬁndings by inclusion of a differing product category (income-producing), property type
(apartments) and location (Phoenix, Arizona), while controlling for possible differences
between foreclosed and non-foreclosed property quality.
The empirical results are consistent with prior studies, and they conﬁrm that prices are
systematically lower when the apartment project seller is a foreclosed property owner.
This ﬁnding corroborates Forgey et al.’s (1994) cautionary remarks regarding the use of
foreclosure sales as comparable sales in appraisal. In addition, this stream of research
should help owners of foreclosure properties to quantify the cost of a liquidation sale, in
terms of discount from market price, versus the offsetting beneﬁts they stand to derive
from a quick sale of a foreclosed real estate asset.
Notes
1The authors gratefully acknowledge an anonymous reviewer who provided this citation and
pointed out that the dummy variable coefﬁcient is not a direct indication of the percentage
difference.
2These two studies reported discounts of 22.8% and 24%, respectively. The reported discounts were
adjusted using the Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) methodology resulting in reductions in
indicated discounts to 20.4% and 21.3%.
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